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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
10389 
In a civil action plaintiff asserts that the defendants 
unlawfully and wrongfully appropriated good will 
inherent in the relationship between a firm of public 
accountants and their clients and, upon dissolution 
failed to account to plaintiff for his share of two part-
nership assets, to-wit: 
1 
(a) the good will inherent in the clienl-publtr 
accountant relationship, and 
(b) work in process at the time of tenrnnat:rn 
of the firm. · 
Plaintiff claims alternatively that he is entitled t" 
damages for breach of a written agreement dated Marri 
7, 1960. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT 
The lower court held that the conduct of the de· 
fendants toward the plaintiff was not tortious; tha, 
defendants were not guilty of any breach of contract; . 
that there was no good will inherent in the relationshir ! 
between the firm of public accountants known as Mei· ; 
sina, Jackson, Caldwell & Co. and their clients, ano 
the court adopted defendants' theory of allocation of 
the asset known as work in process. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant asks this court to reverse tl1t 
determinations made by the trial court and for appru· 
priate orders and judgments as follows: 
A. Determining that the defendants appropriatea 
the bulk of the clients of the firm of Messina, Jackson, 
Caldwell & Co. during the term of the partnership arnl 
t t ·1t that defendants converted a valuable firm asse, 0•11 · 
2 
the good wiJI of the firm, in relevant respects, to the 
exclusion of plaintiff. 
B. That the Plaintiff-Appellant is entitled to an 
~iceountiug for the value of the good will inherent in 
a client-accountant relationship with respect to all of 
the clients of said firm. 
C. That plaintiff is entitled to certain adjustments 
iu the allocation of work in process of the firm of 
~lessina, Jackson, Caldwell & Co. as of :March 31, 
rn62. 
D. Alternatively, plaintiff is entitled to damages 
in accordance with the provisions of a partnership agree-
ment between the parties dated March 7, 1960. 
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS 
The material facts are presented, substantially, in 
the argument. This statement of facts, therefore, is 
presented only as a summary of the facts as they are 
developed in the record. At the trial, the plaintiff was 
incapacitated as a witness. Except for the testimony 
of experts and a small amount of testimony from Mrs. 
Jackson and acquaintances of the plaintiff, primarily 
with respect to his capacity for work as a public account-
ant at relevant times, the evidence consists of the testi-
mony of the defendants, Lenore Bateman, the office 
manager of defendants, the files and records of .l\Ies-
sina, Jackson, Caldwell & Co., a partnership and other 
documentary exhibits. 
3 
Plaintiff was, during the period relevant to thi, 
litigation, a public accountant. He was also authorizeu 
to practice law. l-Iowever, the evidence in this case 1 
, a111J 
the ~atters in issue here relate to his rights arnl prop-
erty mterests as a partner of the firm of Messina, Jac-k. 
son, Caldwell & Co. 
Some time prior to 1952, plaintiff was a parhw 
with Marco Messina as a public accountant. Earlier. 
plaintiff had been a partner of the firm of Messina. 
Jackson & Ulmer (R. 6). Grant Caldwell became 311 
employee of the firm of l\'.lessina, Jackson & Ulmer in 
1950. Lowell Nielson became an employee at about 
the same time ( R. 7) . 
As of April 1, 1955, a new partnership agreement 
was executed between :Messina, plaintiff, Leon Jack· , 
son and Grant Caldwell whereby Caldwell became a i 
general partner. i 
Marco Messina died August 19, 1959. His estalt 
received $7 4,000 from the partnership during the bnl· 
ance of the fiscal year ending March 31, 1960 and dur· 
ing the next two ensuing fiscal years, in addition to Int 
amount due to him by reason of his share of the capital 
account, accounts receivable, works in process and otber 
tangible assets and "book" assets of the partnership. 
In March, 1960, the defendants executed an agree· 
ment with plaintiff which was received in evidence J· 
Exhibit 5. This agreement recited in substance ti13: 
the parties recognized their obligations to the Messm:i 
4 
, slate to pay a percentage of earnings to it as a result 
uf tl1e last partnership agreement during Messina's 
lifetime (Exhibit 4) dated as of April I, 1959. It 
reaffirmed the intention of the parties that the firm 
iroulrl continue in operation after Messina's death and 
that the capital accounts and participation in profits 
nnd 10sses thereafter would be as follows: 
Rulon Jackson 
Grant R. Caldwell 
Lowell Nielson 
Loyd Campbell 
303 
303 
203 
203 
In the early part of 1961, the defendants notified 
plaintiff that they would not honor the 1960 agreement; 
that at the payout of the Messina estate the defendants 
refused to continue any partnership relationship with 
plaintiff; that they would not share clients with him. 
It is the position of the plaintiff-Appellant that this 
conduct, together with the other facts and circumstances 
of the case, demonstrate that by that time defendants 
had already assured themselves that they could already 
hold most of the clients of the firm and their exclusion 
uf the plaintiff constituted an appropriation of the 
firm's most valuable asset, to-wit: the good will inherent 
in the client relationships. Such conduct also constituted 
a breach of contract. 
In order to understand plaintiff's position in con-
!rxt, it is necessary to describe briefly the industry 
practices and the recognition of these practices insofar 
5 
as the firm of Messina, Jackson, Caldwell & C _ , 
Ii, ii 
concerned. 
The Context: Industry Recognition of Cood Will. 
It cannot be disputed in the instant case that publii 
accountants buy and sell practices. The good will In. 
herent in the relationship between professional puhlir 
accountants and the client has a definitive aud deter. 
minable economic value. Both local and national pubill 
accountant trade organizations have developed an
1
J , 
accept standard procedures and formulae with respeti 
to determining the value of these practices and tlie , 
evidence disclosed extensive literature on the subject. , 
The evidence on this phase of the case is treated ill ~ 
greater detail in Points I and IV of the argument 
Although all of the defendants were certified public 
accountants, none of them offered himself as a witnesi 
to deny plaintiff's evidence with respect to the appJic. 
able industry practices and formulae or to contradict 
the evidence adduced by the plaintiff to the effect thai 
the client-accountant relationships which were the asset 
of the firm of Messina, Jackson, Caldwell & Co. werr 1 
in fact salable and had a determinable market value. : 
Defendants called two experts, both of whom testifieu : 
concerning specific sales of client accounts by public ! 
accountants in the area. In one instance the sale 1rn ! 
by the administrator of the estate of a deceased ac· : 
countant and the other was by an accountant who wa) i 
leaving the area. One of the defendants' witnesse~. : 
Ernest C. Psarras, admitted that there was an industry , 
6 
prartice of acqumng client accounts from the estate 
uf a deceased accountant (R. 564) and from an ac-
countant who was moving to another area and from 
au ~.ccountant retiring from the practice (R. 565). He 
also admitted that there was a market for established 
accounts of an accounting firm ( R. 565). 
Good Will of Messina, Jackson, Caldwell & Co. 
The various partnership agreements executed by 
the parties between 1953 and 1960 (Ex. l through 5 
inclusive) and the conduct of the partners and their 
employees dea:rly demonstrate that the partners them-
se!Yes placed value upon good will with clients com-
mensurate with the industry practice. The details of 
these agreements and the conduct of the parties is de-
reloped more fully in Point I of the argument. From 
the partnership records plaintiff demonstrated that 118 
of the clients, representing 73 % of t_he total fees re-
ceived during the fiscal year ending March 31, 1962 
had been clients of the firm since 1955 or prior thereto. 
Only six accounts, representing 3.13% of the fees re-
ceived, representing new business acquired during the 
year prior to March 31, 1962 (Ex. 12). Messina, Jack-
son, Caldwell & Co. was terminated as a partnership 
as of March 31, 1962. The defendants took with them 
149 clients, representing fees of $154,0ll.OO. The 
plaintiff was totally incapacitated as a public accountant 
by the time of the termination of the firm. However, 
he entered into a business relationship with Karl Max-
well and Paul Maxwell in May, 1962, and some of 
7 
the accounts who had been with the old firm be 
• ca111t 
clients of Jackson, Maxwell & Co. The evidence dis 
closes that the plaintiff actually received no personal 
benefit from the business of these clients, but for thi· 
purpose of computing damages the plaintiff concedeil 
that the fees represented by these accounts and !lie 
good will inherent in them might properly be charger! 
against the plaintiff in determining the value of the 
good will for which he was entitled to receive credit. , 
Fees of the clients in this category were in the sum '. 
of $16,865 (Ex. 22). Marco Messina died in August,, 
1959. Under the partnership agreement which was then 
in effect (Ex. 4), Caldwell and Maxwell, who were the : 
surviving general partners, were obligated to pay to the ' 
Messina estate Messina's share of the capital accounh, 
accounts receivable, an amount representing his share 
of work in process (in other words, Messina's share 
of the tangible and book assets of th~. partnership). 
In addition, Messina's estate received for the intan· 
gible value not reflected by any book asset or tangible 
value an amount equal to his share of the total earn· 
ings of the firm for the fiscal year ending March 31, 
1960, and two fiscal years thereafter. The estate re· 
ceived approximately $74,000 on this formula. Mes· . 
sina's estate did not claim any interest in the clients . 
of the firm; instead, they were retained as firm clients : 
and firm assets. Defendants' counsel admitted, in • 
making objections to certain testimony, that the clien:s ; 
were firm assets and that the individual partners did ! 
not have any proprietary interest in them (R. 234, j). 
8 
()ii ~larch 7, 1960, an agreement was executed between 
plaintiff awl the defendants under the terms of which 
tlw parties reaffirmed their intention to continue the 
Jinn after the payout to the :Messina estate, adjusted 
their percentage interest in the partnership and agreed 
lhat upon the death or disability of either of the par-
ties to the agreement, certain remedies and provisions 
of the prior partnership agreement would be applicable 
(Ex. 5). Thus plaintiff was led to believe as late as 
the spring of 1960 that all of the assets of the old firm 
would be kept intact and that he would participate in 
them. 
Appropriation of Accounts and Breach of Contract 
Grant Caldwell and the other defendants began 
their association with lVIessina and Jackson as em-
ployees. Caldwell had no professional accounting ex-
perience theretofore (R. 318). He admitted that he 
nerer did desire to become a partner with the plaintiff. 
The only reason he signed the various partnership 
agreements was because of Messina (R. 319). From 
the beginning of his employment he began to formulate 
judgments as to where the clients of the firm would 
go in the event the partnership was terminated. At 
no time did he disclose to the plaintiff his lack of con-
fidence or his secret calculations with respect to the 
disposition of clients (R. 246-247). 
Shortly after Messina's death, Caldwell began 
assuming the management of the firm operations. The 
9 
office manager testified that she began looking to h' 
1
. un 11; 
what she called "leadership" (R. 349; 240 et seq). 'l'lif 
office manager testified as to her discussions with CairJ 
well or the other defendants with respect to where tli.' 
clients would go if the firm broke up (R. 246, 2471 
She had discussions with Caldwell about personnel 
policies, equipment purchases and other managemen: 
problems, including the dissatisfaction of defendanb 
Nielson and Campbell (R. 236-246). She treatea 
these conversations as confidential (R. 236); she dirl 
not discuss these matters with Mr. Jackson, althougJ1 
it is apparent from the partnership agreement of l9iu 
that upon the payout of the Messina estate, Jackson· 
and Caldwell would have equal interests in the partner· 
ship. I 
At least by the end of 1960 defendants Caldwell, 
Nielson and Campbell had conversations among them· 
selves for the purpose of making effective a plan fo 
carry on the firm to the exclusion of the plaintiff. Al 
that time or in 1961, they began having meetings wilt 
the plaintiff wherein they notified him that they desirea 
that he acquiesce in what they referred to as their pbu 
for his "orderly retirement" (R. 328, 329). The)e • 
conversations culminated in a written ultimatum to lilt · 
plaintiff on April 31, 1961, received in evidence a•: 
Exhibit II. By this time the defendants had satisfiea 
themselves that they could retain the bulk of the clienli 
of the firm (R. 247, 326, 327, 331). Caldwell admittfri 
that in the 1961 discussions, plaintiff was advised nn
1 
only that he would be included in the partnership after 
10 
I 
·1tardi Bl, HH>2, but that the defendants would not 
\Jiarc clients with him (R. 330). 
DeJ:'endauts sought to justify their demands to 
plaiutiff during the early part of 1961 on the ground 
tliat plaintiff was offered the opportunity of purchasing 
their interest in the partnership on the same basis as 
they offered to buy him out. vVhile such offer may 
]wYc beeu made as far as the physical assets, receivables 
au<l similar items were concerned, the defendants ad-
mitted that they did not ever offer to share clients with 
the plaintiff (R. 330). Defendants had satisfied them-
sehes that, according to their best judgment, they 
!1ad the accounts in the palms of their hands ( R. 
:334). Moreover, at the time of their demands, the 
rlefeudants believed that Mr. Jackson was incapable 
of performing accounting functions, particularly in the 
field of audits ( R. 331). Caldwell even told .Mrs. Jack-
son that the plaintiff was "having a mental problem, 
that he should take a vacation, that he should retire" 
(R. 419). 
It is uncontradicted that by March, 1962, plaintiff 
11~1s incapacitated insofar as his public accounting work 
was concerned. Dr. Louis G. J\ioench, a practicing 
]Jsyc·hiatrist whose qualifications were admitted by the 
defendant (R. 235), stated that if objective symptoms 
11ere manifest at any particular time that it would be 
fair to assume that plaintiff's condition, knmvn as 
'enile psychotic reaction (R. 336) would have pro-
gressed to the point of disability at the time that such 
11 
symptoms were manifest (cf 336, 339, 343). There is 
some dispute in the evidence as to whether the 
d . b'l' · d b per. manent isa i ity ex1ste ef ore or after March al, 
1961. It would appear from the Caldwell testimonr 
that the condition preceded that date. Mrs. Jacksou.'
1 
testimony was to the effect that the symptoms did 
1101 
appear until after the 1961 discussions when plaintiff 
was notified in substance that the primary, substantial 
and indispensible assets of the firm, namely the clients. 
were being taken from him. Appellant asks this courl 
to adopt the view that in either event, since the dis· 
ability occurred prior to March 31, 1962, certain pro-
visions of the 1959 agreement, integrated with the 19611 
agreement, were applicable and that the defendants are · 
liabel for the damages and subject to the remedies pro-
vided in these instruments. The trial court dismisseu 
the 1960 agreement as being irrelevant to the issue) 
and made no appropriate findings applicable thereto. 
This action was filed on the 22nd day of l\focu. 
1962, after plaintiff's counsel had notified the defena 
ants that they were in default under the agreementl 
and were wrongfully dealing with the partnership asset). · 
Even after the filing of the action, the defendant Calo· ' 
well continued to purport to manage and deal witi 1 • 
the assets and affairs as though they were his 01rr 1 
private business. He advised plaintiff that if certain 1 
demands were not satisfied, he would proceed to dispw • 
of the assets as he chose (Ex. 17) . On April 11, 196!. : 
after the plaintiff had filed a motion to compel In.' • 
production of the partnership documents for exami· 1 
12 
n:itwn ( H. ~(i, 7), defendant Caldwell advised the plain-
11JJ tha \: l 1c v. ould deli Yer files of clients to the plaintiff 
111 ;1,1• upon :1 written receipt or request from the client 
(Ji,\, ;fl). Deft:ndants' new firm, organized as of April 
L HJ02. stayed in the same office; continued to utilize 
the hooks awl records of the old firm including the 
:icr·11uuh receivable journal which contained substan-
tially all of the relevant and recent information con-
cerning work in process of the firm; used the same 
te]Pphone number; and in effect, continued to maintain 
tl1e .same relationship to the bulk of the firm crents 
as had been maintained by the old firm. Subsequently, 
plaintiff and the defendants agreed upon certain dis-
position of physical assets and payments of amounts 
in ronnection with the accounts receivable of the firm 
as of March 31. The disposition of these assets was 
expressly agreed, however, to be without prejudice to 
the rights and contentions of the parties in the pending 
action. (See Exs. 38, 40, and testimony of Edward 1\1. 
Bown, R. 586) . 
ARGU1\1ENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
FIND ON THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE 
THAT THE FIRJ\I :MESSINA, JACKSON, 
CALD,YELL & CO. HAD AN ASSET IN THE 
XATURE OF GOOD 'VILL 
13 
A. Good will is judicially recognized as an asset. 
Section 48-1-37, U.C.A. 1953, provides in subst· . an1·, 
that the partnership assets include all property belmi~. 
ing to the partnership. An asset is any value or proper;\ 
which is salable or which may be converted into mone; 
It is generally said that an asset is anything that wouirl 
be available in the estate of a deceased to provide funJ. 
for the payment of creditors. Black's Law Dictionar~. 
4th Ed., 151-152 and authorities cited. This court Jia1 
explicitly recognized that good will is an asset. Jn ' 
Halverson v. Walker ( 1910) 28 Ut. 262, ll2 P. sot : 
the court recognized the value of good will in the salt ~ 
I 
of one-half interest in a barber shop. The court said: : 
I 
"Good will, as defined by Lord Eldon, mean~ 
nothing more than the probability that the ola 
customers would resort to the old place." 
1 
I 
In Vercimak v. Ostoich ( 1950), ll8 Ut. 253, 221 P(2di I 
602, this court expressly recognized the existence I 
of good will as an asset in a partnership. The court I 
held that simply because each of the partners had the I 
right to continue separate businesses after dissolution, I 
it did not mean that there was no good will which al· 
1
1 
tached to the business of the firm during its existence 
The court stated explicitly that it chose to follow the 
reasoning of lJfiller v. Hall, 65 Cal. App. (2d) 20~. , 
150 P(2d) 287, 288, and quoted with approval the fol·! 
lowing language from I1 utchins v. Page, 204 :Ma~s. 
284, 90 NE 565, 134 Am. St. Rep. 656: 
14 
":\'either party had any right to avail himself 
of I Ii~ good will of the business, after the ter-
mii wt ion of the partnership, without paying for 
1t. lj~acl1 could commence a new business in his 
o\\'ll name, ancl take a(b:antage of the fact that 
he had formerly been a member of this firm. But 
neither had a right, as against the other, to con-
tiuue the busi11ess of the firm, and retain the 
advantages that comes from a direct succession 
and a continuation of a going business. The 
rnlue of this right, so far as it had a transfer able 
rnlue, belonged to both; and either could insist 
upon having his share of the benefit of it." 
The rationale of Jliller v. Hall, supra, which this 
~ourt explicitly approved in Vercimak v. Ostoich, was 
that eYell after dissolution of a partnership and al-
though the partners had a right to compete with each 
other following the winding up of the affairs of the 
tirm, the partners had an affirmative duty to each other 
to aceount for the value of the good will in the business. 
The eourt q noted part of the foregoing language from 
Hntchins v. Pa,qe, s1ipra, and said: 
"In Ruppe v. Utter, 76 Cal. App. 19, 243 P. 
715, 717, the court said : 
" 'Good will is property recognized and pro-
tected by the law as such, and capable of sale and 
transfer from one owner to another. It is an 
asset ·which may be sold in connection with a 
business.' " 
* * * 
"In the instant case, beyond question, the good 
will of this business would have had a consider-
able nllue had the business been sold to a third 
party." 
15 
An annotation at 65 ALR (2d) 521, et seq., super. 
seding an earlier annotation at 44 ALR 518 d 1 l e?, I 
specifically with the question of partners' duty to ac 
count to other partners for good will upon dissolution; 
of the partnership. The sununary to the annotation ii . 
in part, as f o1lows: .. 
"It seei;ns clear that in so .far as a partnershiv 
can be said to have good will, such good will is 
a proper item on accounting, whether the di~- 1 
solution is caused by the death of a partner or I 
otherwise brought about. Indeed, the statement j 
that good will must be included in the accountu1a ! 
if it is an a~set of the partnership is perhaps~ 
1 
tautology, smce of course all assets having any : 
value must be accounted for, and the fruitful 
inquiry is, rather, when can it be said that the 
partnership does or does not have such an asset.,. 
Appellant submits that where the evidence dern- 1 
onstrates that the good will of a business has a value, 
the authorities hold generally, and this court has un· 
mistakenly embraced the proposition, that the value I 
of the asset must be taken into account in the dealing I 
of partners between themselves upon dissolution of ! 
the firm. The Utah cases and the decisions of California ! 
and Massachusetts which they follow are unmistakably ; 
clear on this point. I 
I 
B. Good will in client relationships is generally recog· ; 
nized by public accountants as having an ascertainable ana 
substantial value. 1 
In Evans v. Gunnip, 36 Del. 589, 135 At!. (2d! I 
128, 65 ALR (2d) 513; ____ Del. ____ , 135 Atl (2d) 135. ' 
16 
11 ,i ALH ;):W, the Supreme Court of Delaware hehl 
,,prcssly that good will was a value in a public account-
:inn partnership and that a retiring partner was en-
titled to share in such good will when the remaining 
partners continued the business. The court ref erred 
tu the testimony of public accountants at the trial to 
tile rttect that there were formulae generally used in 
pro,·ing the value of partnership good will. Prior 
conrluct of the parties demonstrated that they had 
placed a value upon the client relationships as a distinct 
r:1lue of the business. The court rejected the argument 
lhat there could be no good will in a partnership involv-
ing personal services where both partners are free to 
compete with each other after the dissolution. 
The existence of good will in relationships between 
puhlic accountants and clients was unmistakably estab-
lished by the evidence in the instant case. Public 
accountants develop and maintain files and working 
papers concerning the business activities of their clients 
anrl become intimately acquainted with the business 
and personal affairs of clients, including the very sen-
1iti,·e matters relating to federal and state taxation. 
~Iessina, Jackson, Caldwell & Co. had such files. The 
rridenrt:> disclosed that accounting work is performed 
for clients over a period of time, and this also was true 
ilf the subject partnership. This partnership of l\Ies-
sina. Jackson, Caldwell and Co. actually maintained 
rlftailed records to reflect the amount of work performed 
on aecounts at various times of the year (Ex. 14). 
Defendants' "work in process" records plainly demon-
17 
strate that the nature of the accountant-client rel t' · a ion 
ship is relatively continuous; that there is always , 
very substantial amount of unfinished work upon ~lien; 
problems . 
It is a common occurrence for an accountant bi . 
sell a practice ( R. 345, 346) . The administrator fJ! 
executor of a deceased accountant is able to realize 
substantial values for the sale of accounts. Local anrl ' 
national accounting organizations have establishea 
standard procedures and formulae for the sale a1111 . 
evaluation of accounting practices ( R. 356, 358). The~e 
formulae recognize definitive values in good will. A 
value is placed upon a practice separate and apart from 
the physical assets and the so-called book value of the 
concern ( R. 349-383) . 
It is not and cannot be disputed in the instant 
litigation that good will has a recognized value in the 
accounting profession. It is customary, upon the tcr·, 
mination of partnerships engaged in public accounting 1 
work, to recognize the good will value inherent in client ; 
relationships (R. 303). The defendants' witnesse~, • 
Psarras and Kirkham (R. 561-566, R. 566-568), boti1: 
of whom were certified public acc?untants, .admitteJ j 
their knowledge of the sales of public accountmg prac· 
tices in the area. Both of these witnesses had been 
involved in sales and had bid upon practices where 
accountants had died or were leaving the area. Mr 1 
Psarras admitted that he knew there was a practicr i 
to acquire accounts from estates of deceased account· 
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:ii its ( R. 504), retiring accountants ( R. 565) and from 
:ll'co11ntanls leaving the area (R. 564). Defendants' 
t·ounsel referred to and used industry publications in 
noss examining plaintiff's witnesses (R. 369 et seq.). 
Tlte methods of evaluating good will are discussed more 
full)' in Point IV of this brief. It is sufficient at this 
iund1l!"r of the argument simply to reiterate that in 
the accounting profession, the existence of good will 
:lllrl the recognition of its values as positive, determin-
able assets is not disputed and cannot be disputed. 
C. The history and conduct of the partners of Messina, 
Jackson, Caldwell & Co. demonstrate that they recogniz:ed 
that the good will of the partnership had a significant value. 
The asset value to the firm of Messina, Jackson, 
Caldwell & Co. of its clients was clearly and unmis-
takably recognized by the partners and its employees. 
Grant Caldwell admitted that the partnership 
actually paid employees a bonus for bringing new clients 
into the off ice ( R. 605) . The employee obviously was 
paid out of partnership funds. Patently, the partner-
~bip expected to derive a benefit from the expenditure 
of these arnounts, and that part of that benefit neces-
~arily had to be the relationship established with the 
client. 
The individual partner's contributions to the firm 
in terms of the accounts brought into the firm ·was 
dearlr recognized in the partnership agreements. The 
te,fonony of defendant Caldwell was, for example, 
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that Marco Messina was responsible for bringing a. I arr1e ~ercentage of cli:nts into the firm. His participah~11 
m the partnership profits reflected his client gett' - mg 
ability. During the period between 1953 and 1955, lie 
was credited with 623 of the capital and share<l in 
62 % of the profits (Ex. l) . Between 1955 and 195!. 
his percentage was 50 % . Thereafter until his deali: 
his percentage was 45% (Ex. 4). He maintained thii 
interest in the profits and the capital notwithstandinir 
t ' 
the admitted fact that he did not perform audit func· • 
tions on firm accounts. 
Conversely, Grant Caldwell became an employee· 
in 1950, and from the beginning was doing audit work. 
Yet his partnership participation was nominal until, 
1955 when he was entitled to receive 20% (Ex. 2). i 
I 
The 1955 agreement provided that upon dissolution! 
of the firm a "division of client accounts shall be made: 
with the withdrawing partner based upon such facts 
as contribute to an equitable and fair settlement oi · 
the remaining partners with the withdrawing partner.: 
provided that upon withdrawal of Grant Caldwell,. 
he shall be entitled to a division of client account): 
obtained by the partnership after March 31, 1955." i 
(Ex. 2, Art. VIII). 
The partnership agreements over a period of more : 
than ten years implicitly recognized a value in the busi·' 
ness separate and a part from the physical assets as sud • 
or the value of the assets as reflected on the partner , 
ship books. The understanding was that, upon volun 
1 
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t:n'Y withdrawal of a partner prior to 1958, Grant 
caidwell would not share in the client accounts 
iEx. 2, Art. VIII). Upon death or incapacity, in 
the 1955 and 1958 agreements and upon death in 
the 19.59 agreement, the intangible "going concern" 
1rorth was recognized by requiring payment to the 
disabled partner or the estate of the deceased in the 
amount represented by a share of earnings of the 
tirm during the year of death or disability and for 
the two subsequent fiscal years. The 1955, 1958, 
0111d Hl59 agreements are substantially similar with 
respect to the formula used in calculating this value. 
The estate of the deceased or the disabled partner was 
to receive the book value of its,,, capital account plus 
his percentage of profits in the receivables billed but 
not collected at the appropriate date, plus a percentage 
11f work in process. In addition to these amounts, the 
disabled partner or the estate of the deceased was to 
receive a designated share of the profits of the firm 
for the balance of the fiscal year in which death or 
rlisability occurred and the succeeding two fiscal years 
!Ex. 2, Art. X, cf Art. X of Exs. 3 and 4). It is 
submitted that this provision of the agreement and this 
l'oncept of the partnership relationship belies defend-
ants' argument that the good will inherent in the client 
relationship was to remain the property of the indi-
, ridual accountant who was serving the client. The 
analysis of the handling of this matter in the Messina 
tstate is particularly rewarding. Messina had brought 
10mewhere in the neighborhood of 65 % of the clients 
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into the firm, according to defendants' own calculat' 
' !(Jlh 
(Ex. 20) . If the accounts had been deemed to h _ 
131· 
been his personal property rather than assets of t[,, 
firm, Messina's administrator would have been able tr 
sell these accounts in accordance with the obvious 
81111 
well recognized industry practice. The proceeds of th 
sale would have gone into the estate and the partner· 
would not have been able to obtain any interest in tlien, 
except by bidding at the sale. When Messina die11 
however, the administrator did not attempt to sell tilt 
accounts; on the contrary, the firm continued to sem 
them and to have all of the benefits of the accountant 
client relationship inherent in them. Messina's estatt 
was paid approximately $7 4,000.00 as his share of tnt 
profits from the time of his death in August, 19.i~ 
through March 31, 1962 (R. 397, 400, 404; Ex. lh 
The clients were retained intact for the firm. 
The partnership agreement did not explicitly prr 
vide in so many words that the deceased or disableJ 
partner was being paid a percentage of profits for 11;1 
share in the good will of the business. The parties t• 
the agreement were experienced, professional counselor 
in matters related to taxation and tax saving derice' 
It is reasonable to assume that they did not wish;, 
reflect an asset as "good will" on the books of the sur 
viving firm because good will, in an accounting serht 
may not be subject to depreciation and could conceir 
ably have other adverse tax consequences. The plan 
simple fact of the matter is, however, that the g~~I 
will value of these accounts was paid to the Mess111 
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rslate and that in consideration for that payment the 
accounts stayed with the firm. 
In summary on Point I, the record is clear in this 
r·ase that good wilJ is judicially recognized as a partner-
~hip asset. Industry practice by and among public 
accountants is to recognize the value of the good will 
inherent in client relationships. The partners of Mes-
sina, .T ackson, Caldwell & Co. recognized and applied 
the industry practice in the conduct of their business 
and the formation of their partnership agreements. They 
actually paid Messina's estate $74,000 for his share 
of the good will in the partnership after his death. 
Although the def end ants are all certified public ac-
countants, none of them offered to deny any of the 
relevant testimony of the plaintiff's experts with respect 
to industry recognition of good will or to deny plain-
tiff's claim that good will was recognized by the partners 
themselves in the Messina, Jackson & Caldwell firm. 
The court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law did not actually deal in any realistic sense with 
the positions taken by the plaintiff on this phase of 
the case. The trial court skirts the entire problem with 
the bland assertion that the plaintiff did not establish 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the partner-
ship had an asset known as good will. Appellant submits 
that not only did the evidence preponderate to support 
his position but that the defendants themselves, by their 
own conduct and through their witnesses, admitted the 
ralirlity of his contentions. 
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POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING To 
DETERMINE FROlVI THE UNDISPUTED 
EVIDENCE THAT THE DEPENDANTSM. 
PROPRIATED TO THEMSELVES, TO THE 
EXCLUSION OF PLAINTIFF, THE GOOD 
WILL OF THE PARTNERSHIP PRIOR Tn 
THE TERMINATION OF THE FIRM. 
At the trial court, the defendants argued that in·, 
asmuch as they were free to compete for the busine), 1 
of the clients after the firm was terminated, theu i 
failure to account to the plaintiff for the value of tnt 
1 
accounts which they took with them did not constitult 
a breach of duty. The evidence showed, however, thal 
the defendants had successfully appropriated the ac· ': 
counts to themselves more than a year prior to the time i 
when the partnership actually terminated. If the de·• 
fendants either individually or in concert had apprn ' 
priated some tangible asset, such as an automobile, !1 1 
their own use during the period of the partnershir. • 
certainly they would not argue that such conduct ex ; 
cused them from accounting to the plaintiff for iti . 
value. Yet, this is exactly the position taken by tl1f , 
defendants in the instant case insofar as their apprn : 
I 
priation of the good will of the clients was concerneu ; 
In relevant respects, this case is similar to Smili. 
v. Bull (1958, S. Ct. Cal.), 50 Cal(2d) 294, 325P(2il, 
463. In that case the partners Smith and Bull operatr:: 
an advertising agency. During approximately one ye:ir 
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prior to the termination of the partnership, Smith was 
ill and was not active as a partner. The evidence was 
that he was away from the office part of the time. The 
other partner, Bull, gradually took over an account, 
Seaboard Finance Company, which constituted the bulk 
nf the business of the firm. After the partnership was 
terminated the account stayed with Bull. When Smith 
died, Bull refused to credit Smith's estate for any value 
reflecting the good will of the firm in the Seaboard 
account. The evidence showed that a confederate of 
Bull named Roach had told an employee of the firm 
that the main account was "in the palm of his hand; 
he could take it anywhere he wanted to ... " Bull ad-
mitted that he told various people that Smith was 
"erratic and eccentric and that he was taking so much 
medicine that his mind was affected." (Pac. 466, 467). 
The trial court found that the value of the good will of 
the partnership was $53,391.66, based upon testimony of 
a certified public accountant. Smith's estate was award-
ed half of such value. On the third rehearing of the case 
the Supreme Court of California held that the trial court 
judgment should be affirmed. Bull argued that inas-
much as he had the right to accept new business from 
Seaboard after the dissolution of the partnership that 
he should not be "penalized in damages." The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court said: 
"This . . . argument apparently stems from 
defendant's theory that a dissolution of the part-
nership took place when he notified Smith that 
he intended to 'liquidate' the firm." 
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The court then reviewed the facts to emphasizr th, 
during the time that Smith was a member of the fo::', 
Bull's conduct was calculated to assure himself the beil· 
fit of the Seaboard account" . 
. "~efendant's argument ~h~t he is being peii:ii. 
1zed m damages and proh1b1ted from accepti11 ~ 
Seaboard employment, after dissolution, is ilt 
void of merit. The judgment heretofore seH;rli, 
did not purport to a ward plaintiff damages oe 
cause of the appropriation of the Seaboard at 
count, or any portion of the profit made by Bul1 
from that account, but was concerned, so far 3 · 
is here pertinent, with the appropriation ~111 1 
value of the good will of the business. (Emphasi·, 
by the court) . 
"There is no merit to defendant's contentl1111: 
that a personal service organization has no goun t 
will. 
* * * 
"In Miller v. Hall, 65 Cal. App. 2d 200, 21J.'i 
150 P.2d 287, 289, where the partnership ha1!1 
operated by a brokerage business, the court hela • 
'From all of these cases, and many others,: : 
appears to be well recognized that the good 1rill 1 
of a business may have a considerable value. tlia11 
while this value may be seriously affected I•;' 
the competition of a retiring partner, the qt1' 1 
tion of such value is one to be determined rn 
the light of all the facts of a particular case, alii: 
that where such a value exists and is appropri 
ated by one of the former partners for his o:·,' 
use and benefit he may be required to accni1111 ·: 
the other partner for his interest in all/! s11 ' 
value as niay appear under the circ111nstro1t1' 
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" 'In the instant case, beyond question, the 
good will of this business would have had a con-
siderable value had the business been sold to a 
third party.' ,, (Emphasis supplied). 
The court emphasized the fact that Bull waited 
until he was sure that he would have the Seaboard 
account before he terminated the partnership with 
Smith. Quoting the earlier California case of Bergum 
v. Weber, 135 Cal. App(2d) 389, 392, 288 P(2d) 623, 
625, the court said: 
"As the court stated in Bergum v. Weber, 
136 Cal. App. 2d 389, 392, 288 P.2d 623, 625, 
'The customers of a business are an essential part 
of its goodwill. In fact, without their continued 
custom goodwill ceases to exist, for goodwill is 
the expectation of continued public patronage. 
" 
The court compared the conduct of Bull with the results 
that would have been attained if Bull had sold the 
business as a going concern. The court pointed out 
that "had the Smith and Bull agency been sold to a 
third person, that goodwill, because of the Seaboard 
account, would have been considered a valuable asset 
of the partnership." (Pac. 469) . 
In the instant case it is clear that the dominating 
force in the operation of the partnership after Messina's 
death was defendant Grant Caldwell. Caldwell ad-
mitted that he had never had any professional account-
ing experience prior to his employment by the Messina, 
Jackson firm (R. 318). He admitted that he had 
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observed and studied the partners and their ,,1· , 
" 1e11,. 
between the time of his employment and thrnugJ
111
w 
the relevant period of time ( R. 319). He testified li1:tt 
he had never believed that Rulon Jackson was qualilii,
1 
to practice professional accountancy and that he liaii 
no desire to become a partner of Jackson (R. 3!D 
He said that the only reason he signed the rnri
1111
, 
partnership agreements between 1953 and 1960 11,, 
because of Messina ( R. 319). Caldwell acknO\rledge 
his continuous study of the clientele of the firm 1R. 
319). As early as 1953, he had formulated judgme11 \, 
as to where the clients of the firm would go in the ere111 i 
the partnership was terminated. And he admitted tha: 
1 
at no time did he disclose to the plaintiff his feelin~· · 
toward him or his lack of confidence in his prof essio11:1: 
ability or his secret calculations with respect to tl1t 
distribution of the clients. Following JYiessina's deatlt 
Caldwell assumed direct and effective management 011 
the firm. The office manager had discussions with him! 
with respect to personnel policies, dissatisfaction:/' 
other defendants (R. 237, 288), purchase of equipme11l [ 
(R. 241), and similar questions, although she did 1wi i 
have similar conversations with Jackson (R. 239). Sl11 : 
also had conversations with Caldwell with respect ti' 
assignment of personnel to handle clients' business a11 1 
what would happen to the account in the event of d11• 
solution of the firm. It is admitted that neither )Ir' 
Bateman, the office manager, nor Grant Caldwell. nn: r 
the other defendants, discussed such matters with tli· 
plaintiff. In March, 1960, notwithstanding his serrr 
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intention to exclude plaintiff from the partnership, 
Grant Caldwell executed an agreement with him which 
clearly indicates that plaintiff was being led to believe 
that the partnership would continue following the pay-
out of the Messina estate (Ex. 5). Caldwell knew that 
other accountants in the office were doing the work 
on the accounts which were generally referred to as 
Jackson's clients (R. 322). After the defendants had 
had ample opportunity to assure themselves that they 
could hold the bulk of the firm's business, they com-
menced having conversations with the plaintiff to the 
effect that he was being excluded from the firm after 
.•: the payments to the Messina estate were completed. 
:' · In the early part of 1961, plaintiff was notified that 
1:; he should acquiesce in defendants' plan for what Cald-
i 
1t l well brazenly characterized as plaintiff's "orderly re-
11. ~ tirement" (R. 329). Caldwell admitted that in the 
I 
i1: early 1961 discussions, and at all times thereafter, he 
i 
m 1 told plaintiff that he would not continue the partner-
!'!• ship with him after March 31, 1962 and that he would 
i 
11:' not share clients with him (R. 330). At the time of 
11! defendant's demands upon plaintiff to leave the prem-
l1r ises, notwithstanding their solemn promises of only 
h1 eight months earlier, there were discussions as to 
11t whether plaintiff could be excluded (R. 241). It became 
11· common knowledge in the office that a new firm was 
r1 to be organized after the payout of the Messina estate, 
1n: and that plaintiff would not participate (R. 240, 242). 
The defendants' position that their conduct was 
,iustified because the clients could "go where they 
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pleased" is obviously with tongue in cheek Det'ei <l , 
' I a111, 
counsel admitted that all the accounts and the good 
inherent in client relationships belonged to llie lir: 
(R. 234, 235). They had already assured tliemsel.: 
that when Rulon Jackson was pushed out tlie r1 
10111 
substantially all of the clients would stay. Deftnd:p
1 
knew that plaintiff was ill. Caldwell admitted that thti: 
was an increase in the number of incidents where pbi 
tiff manifest a loss of memory or forgetfulness 
1
1
1 
325). He related some of the office jokes about phii~ 
tiff's errors in deposit slips and the fact that his person
1
,, 
records were being maintained by someone else in ti,! 
office (ibid). In the 1961 meetings, Caldwell told)Jr,
1 
Jackson that he thought that plaintiff was "harina ,i 
~ I 
mental problem, that he should take a vacation, tl1:r 
he should retire" (R. 419). 
When plaintiff was :finally forced out, defendam ! 
Caldwell, Nielsen and Campbell remained in the sarn'! 
office, entered into a new partnership, kept all its phy; ~ 
cal files, including working papers, of the old firm. a1ni 
even used the accounts receivable ledger of the 11] i 
firm ( R. 242, 243) . And, of course, they kept the bul : 
of the one class of assets without which the bnsi11t" 1 
I 
could not operate, namely the clients. 
The Appellant asks this court to determine tit:: 
based upon the defendants' own admissions as to !]iii 
conduct, that their converting the accounts to tbi.. 
selves prior to the termination of the partnersh'.~ 
tortious. The doctrine of Smith v. Bull is dispositni 
30 
ir, 
],, 
011' 
Summarizing on Point II, it is undisputed that the 
accounts of Messina, Jackson, Caldwell & Co. had a 
po~itive, determinable value at all times prior to March 
HI, 1962, and that they could have been sold. Indeed, 
thev were the most valuable asset the firm possessed. 
fh~ details of the methods of appropriation which 
Grant Caldwell and the other defendants employed to 
obtain these accounts are immaterial. All of the sub-
iL 
1 
tleties of their conduct may well be beyond direct evi-
a11~.i dence. The undisputed fact is, however, that in all 
1n ,
1 
relevant respects the defendants appropriated the 
tl • clients. During the term of the partnership and at least 
\Ir 
1 
prior to the ultimatums delivered by defendants to 
1g, ! plaintiff in the spring of 1961, they had determined to 
!hr their own satisfaction that this extremely valuable 
partnership was theirs to the exclusion of the plaintiff. 
They knew that they had the accounts in the palms of 
their collective hands; they knew that the plaintiff was 
ill. Appropriation of the clients of the firm was the 
1Y' · culmination of a plan which had been formulated in 
at:· the mind of Grant Caldwell seven or eight years earlier. 
0
' 
1
· Appellant submits that the failure of the court to apply 
IJ11i, the principles of Smith v. Bull requires reversal . 
11r: 
tk 
\t', 
POINT Ill. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
REQUIRE DEFENDANTS TO ACCOUNT TO 
THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE MARKET 
31 
VALUE OF THE GOOD 'VILL IN TILE , 
COUNTS 'VHICH THEY APPUfH>RlAT;~lJ 
Plaintiff established a precise rnarket rnltie l', 
\) 1:1 
good will represented bv the clients served br ir,. ·· 
.J ,l ,\ CS"t'' 
Jackson, Caldwell & Co. This evidence w·1,. a(I] · <-' .I lll't• 
from knowledgeable experts with experienee Iu 1111 
purchase and sale of accounts in the intermountain art 
and in the state of Utah. Donald I-I. Pickett, a cerlint: 
public accountant with experience in accounting ~iu1 , 
1950, identified and referred to a number of inrllllir. 
publications related to buying and selling of punl:, 
accounting practices. The publications inclndui l~, 
Accounting Practice JHanagement Handbook eilitt: 1 
I 
by James H. McNeil, an article by Robert E. Witcl1.: 
published in the Certified Public Accountant's H1rn1! f 
book, which is a publication of the American InstiMj 
of Certified Public Accountants; a study made b)· ~I 
Sproul entitled "Accountant's Fees and Prunts,'' p11I I 
. I 
lished by Professional and Trade books, Ltd., Lowl1::, i 
1951; a work entitled Guides to Successful Acco1111li11: 
Practices by Bernard Isaacson, who is second eM l 
of the Practitioner's Forum, a regular departmenti f 
the Journal of AccountanCJJ, and various articlespu1 j 
lis~ed in the J oumrnal. of _Account~mcy witl~ r,~spedi 1
1
' 
retirement plans, prof ess1onal etl11cs and 'a11at10n 
practices (R. 347, 348). These publications 1rere l' 1 '~i 
monly available to and used by members of the pulq 
• jl 
accounting profession in the area (R. 34<8, 3±91 I I 
testified as to the nature of the O'enera l considerab ! 0 
· (R 3·0\ q involved in the purchase of a practice . ':J · · 
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stated that in his judgment and as a result of his experi-
rnee au<l studies, the formula which would represent 
~fair and reasonable one to be used by a willing seller 
and a willing buyer to arrive at a market price for a 
practice would be represented by 100% of the prior 
itar's gross fees (R. 359). While there would be ad-
justments for non-recurring business, the industry 
reeognized such a formula as being reasonably accurate. 
On cross examination, Mr. Pickett made reference to 
a plan described in one of the identified publicatio!:s 
as the "Bridgeport Plan". Under that particular pro-
cedure, the purchaser would be expected to pay 1003 
of the gross fees of clients who had been with the firm 
four years or more; 75% of the fees of clients who had 
been with the firm from three to four years; 50% of 
the fees of clients having a history of two to three 
years, and 25% of the fees of clients being with the 
firm from one to two years. In addition, the purchaser 
1 would pay 25% of the amounts received as special fees 
during the preceding four years ( R. 369) . Mr. Pickett 
i applied these formulae, together with his own experi· 
i ence in the purchase and sale of accounts locally and 
1 
made a judgment with respect to the amount for which 
i the clients of the Messina, Jackson, Caldwell firm 
, \ could have been sold. It was his judgment that the good 
1
1 will Yalue of the firm was $150,000. From this sum he 
, i deducted the good will value of the accounts served 
1[,\ 
ti\ hy Jackson, Maxwell & Co., the firm with whom the 
\ plaintiff became associated after the termination of the 
partnership with the defendants. From Mr. Jackson's 
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share of .Messina, Jackson, Caldwell dicnts (-~ 7 • ' •p .J.111111 
he deducted the total ntlue of the elieuts th·tt . 
• ( l\t'1:1 
the Jackson, l\Iaxwell firm ( $17 ,500) to arriYe at . 
net amount due from the defendants to tJ1,, Ill ' a111 
as the balance due plaintiff for his share of the "' . 
will of the firm, in the sum of $57,000. An apph~t : 
on a comparable basis of the generally accepted in<lush I 
formula, to-·wit: 100% of gross billing after <lednl'i 
of non-recurring fees, would result in an a11arr! 
plaintiff of $60,698. An application of the lhidgep111 l 
Plan results in an award to plaintiff of $58,605. J!t I 
sina's estate received $7 4,000, which was 4;·v;. uf 1', 1 
good will. One hundred percent of the good will, the~I 
fore, should be valued at $164,000, and the amnu i 
to be awarded to l\fr. Jackson would be $61,085 inl 
payment was calculated upon the amount paid !1111 I 
:Messina estate. A tabulation of these factors in ii I 
I 
valuation of good will is appended to this brief i 
Appendix A. 
The defendants called two certified public arc11111 
ants in the area. In effect, these witnesses admitted il 
it was common practice to buy and sell accounts. E ! 
of them had participated in such purchases or sale1 I 
each had exercised his own judgment in the vahwli,: 
of practices. Neither of these defendants <lenieil' 
validity of the approaches utilized by Mr. Piclr i 
Neither of them denied the applicability of the form:.: 
100% of gross billings in an ordinary purchase sit·· 
tion. 'Vhile these witnesses testified as to their h1 • : 
edge in two separate distress sales, neither of:] ! 
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tleuied that a going practice could be sold in the market 
upon the application of one or more of the industry 
formulae established by plaintiff's evidence. 
Although all of the defendants are certified public 
accountants and have access to the industry information 
utilized by l\fr. Pickett in his valuation, none of them 
offered their testimony to deny either in substance or 
effect his conclusions as to the valuation of the good 
1rill in the firm. On the contrary, Mr. Caldwell ad-
mitted that when new partners were admitted to the 
firm beginning April l, 1962, consideration was given 
to the amount of practice which they brought with 
them. 
Appellant suggests that it is appropriate for this 
court to determine that Appellant is entitled to a judg-
ment against the defendants in the sum of $57,500 plus 
interest since April l, 1962 on the ground that it rep-
resents the lowest amount which he would receive upon 
application of the formulae in the record. 
The approaches to the plaintiff upon the question 
of valuation of good will were substantially identical 
to those approved by the court in Evans v. Gunnip 
(S.Ct. Del. 1957) 36 Del. 580, 135 A(2d) 128, 65 ALR 
(2d) 1957; ____ Del. ____ , 135 A(2d) 134, 65 ALR(2d) 
320,andSmith v. Bull (S. Ct. Cal. 1958), 50 Cal.(2d) 
294, 325 P ( 2d) 463. Particularly since the defendants 
did not avail themselves of any opportunity to deny 
the ralidity of plaintiff's approach, and the fact that 
!he computations concernmg damages are in accord-
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ance with the u~disputed industry practice, Appelb:; 
suggests that tlus court should instruct the l(l\\'"r ~ ('111111 
to make an award in a sum certain without reqt · :, 
ll)J,ir 
further proof on the subject. ' 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING T!i 
REQUIRE DEFENDANTS TO ACCOUNT'Hi 
PLAINTIFF FOR THE VALUE OF 'VORK n 
PROCESS SINCE MARCH 31, 1962 BASED 
UPON THE PROXIMATE INVESTMENTn 
SUCH ASSET PRIOR TO SAID DATE. 
Defendants, acting by defendant Grant R. Ca!Q 1 
well, purported to make an accounting to the plainti~: 
after the instant action was filed for the amount oi 
credit plaintiff was to receive for work in process. Prior 
to the termination date of the old firm, to-wit: Marci 
31, 1962, it had incurred certain expenses in antiri· 
pation of fees to be paid in the future by firm client1 
The amounts which were billed as of March 31, 19u! 
and prior thereto were accounts receivable of the firm. 
the parties have no substantial dispute with respect'', 
the amount of money which the plaintiff should receir,I 
for these items. But the investment made in the fe1·1 
which were still in process and unbilled as of the kr 
mination date gave rise to a substantial contrwrsr • 
It is Appellant's position that he is entitled; 
share in fees received from clients whose work wai' 
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.. 
prc•ce~s on .March 31, 1962 based upon the total pro-
iortionate investment made in the fee compared with 
:he im·estment made in the fee after the effective 
termination date. Defendants' own figures showed that 
the old firm had invested a total of $58,203 in the amount 
if fees received. The investment consisted of $6,936 
in travel expense and $51,267 in time expense. These 
figures are from the defendants' own computations 
as they appear in Exhibits 14 and 32. The travel ex-
pense for the new firm for the period following March 
:n, 1962 was $3,760. After making an adjustment 
for a time rate increase made by the new firm after 
, 1Iarch 31, 1962, the defendants effectively conceded 
al the trial that the time expense of the new firm for 
which it was entitled to credit was $45,435.00 (Ex. 
32). Thus, using defendants' own figures, the total 
investment in the fee by the new firm was $49,195, 
and the total investment by the old firm was $58,203. 
The total fee for the entire year for these same clients 
was $107,398. Appellant submits that the old firm 
should have received 54.19% of the fees, having in-
mted 54.19% of the time and expense. The new firm 
would receive 45.81 % of fees, having made a 45.81 % 
investment. A tabulation of these figures appear as 
follows: 
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Item 
Time expense 
Travel expense 
Total expense 
Percentage of 
Old Firm 
$51,267.00 
G,936.00 
58,203.00 
New Firm 
$45,435.00 
3,760.00 
49,195.00 
costs incurred 54.19% 45.81 % 
Amount of fees due old firm at 54.19% 
of total fees ($120,861.00) 
Amount of fees due new firm at 45.81 % 
of total fees ($120,861.00) 
Total 
forE1J1i1, 
F'ee Ye:: 
$ 96,70;1: 
10,Gn(;i 
107,3981, 
10(1 
65,49j11 
55,360.I 
Rather than adopting plaintiff's theory concrr: 
ing an allocation of work in process credit, the tn: 
court followed the proposal of Grant Caldwell (Fin: 
ing No. 20; R. 191). Under the Caldwell plan, ti 
Messina, Jackson firm would receive a total credit 1 
$52,550.75 plus travel expense of $·6,936, for a tolt 
of $59,543.75. In other words, based on Mr. Caldwell 
calculations, the old firm would receive only 49~ 
the fees while having incurred 54% of the expen1• 
The new firm would receive 51 % of the fees wl1i 
having incurred only 45% of the expense. Cald11r 
achieved this inequitable result by applying two nwtu· 
matical procedures: ( 1) He deducted the "travel :1r, 
maintainment" expense from the total expenses !: 
curred by the respective firms. Since the old firm Ji:, 
travel expense of $6,936.42 and the new firm 0( 
$3,753.18, the result was to reduce the investment · 
the old firm and therebv decrease the percentagi 
fee which it would rece~ve. (2) Caldwell rnnde 
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iudiridual allocation of the fee for each client, rather 
than using total charges on the basis of applying a 
reasonable average profit alloc~tion over the entire 
,-ear. Appellant suggests that such accounting manipu-
iation is falacious on its face because the result is inequit-
Jhle. It may be that there are situations where the 
amounts of money invested in time expense should be 
credited before the fees are divided. The fees paid by 
clients included all expenses of the firm including the 
travel expense used in calculating the amount of the 
fee. The client's bill did not itemize travel expense as 
a separate item any more than it itemizes rent or steno-
graphic cost. The firm's purpose in recording travel 
expense was only to analyze its internal operations. 
It is as logical to deduct stenographic expense before 
dividing the fee as to deduct travel expense. Would 
Caldwell have used that device if it had suited his pur-
pose? The device of separate computations for each 
client is equally pernicious. Defendants were in con-
trol of all the records during the whole relevant period. 
Appellant submits that the trial court's adoption of 
the Caldwell computation on this point is erroneous 
and should be reversed. Appellant submits that a device 
1rhereby defendants come up with 51 % of the fee after 
incurring only 45 % of the expenses of service to the 
account was conceived by design rather than by appli-
cation of pure accounting theory. Such a disparity 
might occur in serving IO or 15 accounts, but de-
fendants had 145 accounts and the work for them ex-
lfn<led OYer an entire year. In a normal operation, 
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the results achieved by Caldwell could not happen:'' 
would not happen. · 
POINT V. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING J, 
FIND AND DETERlHINE ALTERNATI\! 
LY THAT PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLEDTi 
RECOVER DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF. 
CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARm. 
DATED MARCH 7, 1960. 
I 
Plaintiff pleaded in the alternative that the ,1 
fendants breached a contract dated March 7, 196oac: 
that plaintiff was entitled to recover damages pursuJ 
to the provisions of that instrument. The defendani 
admitted the execution of the contract. The court r-i 
fused to make any Findings of Fact or Conclmiri 
of Law with respect to the issues involved on this cat·; 
I 
of action. The court found simply that the contr1; 
was executed, but that it was immaterial to the im1 
in the case and completely ignored all of the ol~j 
questions involved. The relevant facts with resped/ 
the determination of the issues on this cause of adq 
were not and cannot be disputed. j 
The last partnership agreement executed by M~I 
Messina during his lifetime was dated as of Apr~ I 
1959. '¥hereas the prior instruments had been r~ 
pared by the plaintiff, the 1959 agreement (Ex. 4)~:! 
' ,, 
prepared for the partners by the firm of Semon: 
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Senior ( R. 227) . This instrument does not explicitly 
iruiide for the continuation of the partnership after 
:he payout of the Messina estate. The understanding 
that the firm would continue, however, is implicit from 
the fact that Messina's estate did receive its full share 
of payment for the value of the good will inherent in 
, the partnership accounts, and that these accounts were 
: served by the partnership after the estate was paid. 
If this had not been the intention of the parties, there 
:. would have been no reason for the surviving partners 
to agree to pay the estate of the deceased its share of 
: earnings for more than two years after the date of 
'J death. 
I 
l'. 
IJ. On March 7, 1960, defendants Nielsen, Campbell 
ir\ and Caldwell executed an agreement with the plaintiff 
r·: which was received in evidence as Exhibit 5. 
If' 
Paragraph 6 of the instrument contains certain 
aL, provisions applicable to the distribution of profits dur-
,,,'. ing the time of the payout of the Messina estate and 
;1~j :nding March 31, 1962. Certain provisions of the 1959 
, l urntrument were applicable in the event of a death of 
C11 • • 
•
11
! any of the partners but were not applicable m case 
t : of disability. Prior partnership agreements had pro-
1 zided for protection to a partner upon disability and 
!ad there is no explanation of the omission of such pro-
1rli \ tection in th: 1959 agreement other than the ~act th~t 
r1 Marco Messma was known to have been seriously ill 
I di at the time of the execution of the 1959 instrument and 
P the partners may have believed that he was on the 
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verge of disability when he executed it. In a , 
n:1 t\11 
paragraph 7 of the 1960 instrument (Ex 5) . · 
• pror1,j 
as follows: 
'.'T· In the event of death or permanent 
11
.: 
abihty of any of the parties hereto tJ11'8 .1 ' . . ' · i1gn 
ment shall become null and void msofar a, ,
1 
deceased ?r disa~l~d p.arty is concerned, aiiu 1
1 p~rtnersl~1p participation shall be in accoroa
11 
/ 
with Articles VIII, IX and X of the parti
1
, I 
ship agreement of Messina, Jackson, Ca!d11, 
& Compa~y dated April 1, 1958 and amenrit 
as of April 1, 1959, provided, further, that in!! 
event of death or permanent disability to,~, 
party hereto, the above agreement shall nu
11
,, 
theless remain binding to the surviving or r· i 
maining parties." 
Article X of the 1959 agreement, which was r:
1 
ferred to in the 1960 agreement, provides that the sll'I 
viving partners shall cooperatively carry on the busin~·I 
to enable performance of the payout plans proviac,\ 
in Article XI and that he shall not compete with ll·I 
partnersh~p or serve any of the partnership ~lients ai,.:I 
that he will pay the sum of $500 for each ''.10latwn, I 
his covenant .plus one-half. o! any co~pensahon den'',.1 
from rendermg the proh1b1ted service. As explaw' 
infra, the 1960 agreement was applicable in the eii;I 
of death or disability. A composite of Article X, taklli,I 
into account the changes effected by the 1960 agr"'I 
ment, is as follows: 
"The parties hereto each for himself, prn111 '· 
and agree with the other partners here!~ t]i·~-1 
after the [permanent disability J of one ot tk : 
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l 
he as a survivor will continue as a partner and 
cooperatively carry on the partnership business 
for the fractional year in which [permanent dis-
ability J of one of them occurs and for the two 
full fiscal years thereafter, for the purpose of 
completing the payout to the [permanent dis-
abled] partner (as provided for in Article IX 
hereinabove.) 
"If a surviving partner does not cooperatively 
carry on the partnership business with the other 
surviving partner or partners for the purpose of 
carrying out the plan of payout to the [perma-
nently disabled} partner as provided for in Arti-
cle IX hereinabove, then such action shall con-
stitute a withdrawal by him from the partner-
ship. Upon such withdrawal by him he shall not 
be entitled nor shall he have any right to receive 
any payment on account of his interest in the 
partnership until payment in full has been made 
to the [permanently disabled} partner. 
"Further, in order to assure full pay-off to the 
[disabled] partner, under Article IX herein-
above, the partners, parties hereto, each for him-
self covenants and agrees with the other parties 
hereto, that should he so withdraw from this 
partnership after obligation has arisen to pay 
off the [permanently disabled] partner and be-
fore full performance of such pay-off: 
"I. That he will not serve any client of the 
partnership served by the partnership within one 
year prior to the effective date of his withdrawal 
from the partnership; 
"2. That he will pay to the [permanently dis-
abled] partner the sum of $500.00 for each vio-
lation of his covenant and promise hereunder 
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plus or,ie-half of any_ c?mpensation derired 
11 rendermg such proh1b1ted service." • 
Caldwell admitted that he construed the l96fJ 
agr1 
~ent to mean that in the event Jackson became incai: 
c1tated, the applicable provisions of the 1959 agrr 
ment would become effective (R. 558, 559). There 
no doubt that the defendants refused to cooperatin! 
carry on the partnership business with Mr. Jach:; 
The evidence is unmistakably clear that during ill 
spring of 1961, they told him that they would notr.I 
main partners with him, that they would not s~i:I 
accounts with him, and that they would not confo:' 
their association or any association with him as a parlnt! 
Their answer admits that they refused to carry onfo 
business as partners with him after March 31, 190!. 
It is also unmistakably clear and cannot be rea~of 
ably disputed that the evidence shows that some t~ 
before March 7, 1960, the date of the 1960 agreemrl 
and March 31, 1962, plaintiff became totally and~e:j 
manently disabled insofar as his ability to functiou~i 
.I 
a public accountant was concerned. Appellant contenu .• 
1
1 
that the evidence reasonably fixes the date of tlrn 11 
capacity as the spring of 1961. It was during this peri1!1 
of time that Caldwell told Mrs. Jackson that in Cik 
well's opinion plaintiff was having mental proble!Ji 
that he should retire. The evidence showed that pla~ 
tiff's conduct had become so erratic prior to the spriL 
of 1961 that it was the subject of frequent office jolr 
Mrs. Jackson testified that she noticed no abnom I 
behavior of any consequence until following the t~. · 
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when the plaintiff had been delivered the ultimatums 
ov the defendants with respect to leaving the firm. 
1\rhether the appropriate date was before or after 
. ~larch 31, 1961, however, relates only to the plaintiff's 
riuht to obtain a proportionate share of earnings after 
jJardi 31, 1963. It is conceded that he received his share 
of partnership earnings for the year ending March 31, 
!962. His disability occurred after March 31, 1961. 
At least he was entitled to a percentage of the part-
nership earnings for the year ending March 31, 1963 
plus the amount of formula damages as provided in 
Article X. These damages consisted of one-half of the 
fees from accounts serviced plus $500 for each account 
~Tongfully serviced in violation of the agreement. De-
fendants serviced 149 partnership accounts after their 
oreach. (This figure is the result of simply counting 
toe number of clients as reflected in the partnership 
records and working papers in evidence, cf. Ex. 6, 
14, 20). At $500 per account, plaintiff is entitled to 
recover $74,500 for this item. It is impossible to deter-
mine the actual earnings of the defendants after March 
ol, 1962 because they joined forces with other account-
ants and the total earnings of the firm after that date 
were computed on different bases. Appellant contends 
tllat a reasonable computation of such earnings would 
oe an average for the three fiscal years ending 1960, 
1961 and 1962. Such amount would be $27,203. Fifty 
[lercent of the fees received from the accounts serviced 
for the year following March 31, 1962 is $77,055.50. 
l'nder the contract theory, therefore, plaintiff is entitled 
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to recover, in addition to the amounts due hiin f . m~ 
m process as of March 31, 1962, the sum of $17S7", 
plus interest at 6% from March 31, 1962. 'oR, 
Appellant submits that under the prorision, 
Rule 8 (a) and 8 ( e) and the authority of Rosan&r 
Larsen, (1962), 14 Ut(2d) 1, 376 P(2d) 146,the,t 
pellant is entitled to a determination of the issues ; 
sented in this cause of action. The undisputed f;
1
,, 
support planitiff's claim for relief. · 
I 
I 
CONCLUSION 
It can hardly be doubted that partners owe toed 
--, 
other the duty to refrain from converting partnerskl 
assets to the exclusion of each other. The error oHI 
I 
trial court apparently results from the failure to rea~i 
that the good will of :Messina, Jackson, Caldwell &Cl 
was a valuable asset of the firm and that when thd0, 
f endants converted the good will inherent in the clir:) 
relationships to their own use they were perpetratlli:! 
a wrong upon the plaintiff. As clearly decided il 
Smith v. Bull, the defendants cannot excuse theirfau[i 
to account to plaintiff upon dissolution of the furui,·1 
this valuable asset by arguing that they had the riii. 
to compete with the plaintiff after dissolution wk 
the facts demonstrate that they had converted thea~i 
to themselves during the time that they were partw·.I 
of plaintiff. The good will could have been sol~ et!ll 
during the existence of the firm or upon its terminit,• 
1 
Failure to account to the plaintiff for his share iii ' 
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i 
l 
ralue is clearly wrongful and the judgment of the trial 
court to the contrary requires reversal. 
The work in process allocation proposed by the 
defendants and a pp roved by the court does not achieve 
justice between the parties as far as this asset is con-
~erued. Even though the arithmetical processes em-
ployed to reach the result may be accurate, plaintiff 
is entitled to share in the fees received from the clients 
to whom the work in process allocation is applicable 
upon the basis of the investment in the fee of the old 
firm in ratio to the total investment in the fee by the 
defendants' new firm after April 1, 1962. The court's 
ruling to the contrary requires reversal on this phase 
of the case. 
Alternatively, this court should determine that the 
conduct of the defendants constitutes a breach of the 
agreement between them and the plaintiff of March 
i, 1960, and that plaintiff is entitled to the damages 
provided in that instrument. Appellant submits that 
the damages can be computed from the existing record 
io that no further evidence is required. At the least, 
the court should remand the case for determination of 
damages upon the contract theory. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day 
of October, 1965. 
GEORGE M. McMILLAN and 
FRANKLIN D. JOHNSON 
1020 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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APPENDIX A 
VALUATION OF GOODWILL 
- Bridgeport Plan 
100% Gross Billings after 
Mr. Pickett's Value Deduction no-recurring fees I Total Fee I 
Payment to Messina Estate 
Fee Times for Good Will 
Percent 
I I 
--
Normal Fees 
Based on personal experience, Total fees, 100% fees, 4-yr. clients $128,166. I $128,166. $ 74,000. = 45~; 
generally accepted formulae Schedule A 
$172,526. 75% fees, 3-4 yr. clients 9,375. I 7,031. 1.633. Ir; -
and criteria and the relevant Deduct non-recurring 
50% fees, 2-3 yr. clients 18,535. 9.263. 164.000 ~100'; 
facts obtained from operating 25% fees, 1-2 yr. clients 2,500. 
625. ' 
Schedule C 13,950. I 
experience of firm. Non-recurring Fees I 
25% of special fees for preceding 
4 yrs.* 55,800. 13,930. 
Total Value 
Good Will $150,000. $158,576. 
$159,040. $164,000.00 
NET CREDIT TO PLAINTIFF FOR GOOD "TILL 
Appraised value of accounts Total actual fee to Jackson, Normal Fees 
18,590. The highest value in other 
serviced by Jackson, Maxwell Maxwell & Co. minus non-re- 100% fees, 4-yr. clients 
18,590. 0 formulae is used for compara-
& Co. curring fees 75% fees, 3-4 yr. clients 
0 0 ii \·e purposes. 
Total Value 
50% fees, 2-3 yr. clients 0 
0 
Good Will 
25% fees, 1-2 yr. clients 0 
2,325. 
17,500. 
---
50% Total 75,000. 18,590. Non-Recurring Fees 
s 20.915. s 20,915.00 
Less retained 17,500. 79,288. 25% of special fees for preceding 
79,520. 82.000.00 
18,590. 4 yrs.* 
9,300. 20,915 20,915.00 
Net Due Plt. for 
Good Will $ 57,500. 
$ 58,605. $ 
61,085.00 
$ 60,698 
'For p . 1 t ti ecial fees for each of the three pr·eceding 
urposes of this calculation, special fees for the year ending March 31, 1962 were assumed to be equa 
0 1~ sp 
Years. The compa t' . . . h ption is conservative. ra 1ve operatmg statements for prior years (Ex. P-21) md1cate that sue assum 49 
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